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on whether famed movie director John McTiernan can withdraw his guilty plea to an information charging him with making false statements to a federal agent. The court vacated McTiernan's conviction and four-month prison sentence, ruling that a reasonable person in McTiernan's position would not have pled guilty if he had been properly advised by counsel as to the possibility of suppressing the evidence incriminating him in the Anthony Pellicano wire-tapping scandal. McTiernan, 57, who directed such films as Predator, Die Hard, and The Hunt for Red October, falsely told agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigations that he had hired Pellicano as a private investigator one time in connection with his divorce, but had no knowledge of Pellicano's illicit wiretapping activities. He later admitted that he had hired Pellicano in or around August 2000 and paid him at least $50,000 to conduct an illegal wiretap of two individuals, one of whom was Charles Roven, the producer of box-office flop Rollerball that McTiernan was directing at that time. Pellicano installed the wiretaps, listened to the subjects' business and personal telephone calls, and reported their contents to McTiernan. He also recorded his conversations with Mc Tiernan. FBI agents recovered a recording of a conversation between Pellicano and McTiernan pursuant to a search warrant in the investigation and prosecution of Pellicano. In the recording, Pellicano informed McTiernan that he had intercepted "tons of stuff" from the wiretapped subjects' phones. McTiernan instructed Pellicano to focus on instances where Roven was "saying one thing to the studio and saying something else to others," and said that catching the producer "bad mouthing" the "studio guys" would "really be useful." After the government informed McTiernan of the evidence against him, he entered into a written plea agreement, saying he would plead guilty to one count of lying to an FBI agent. The plea agreement set forth the elements of the offense, the statutory maximum sentence, the constitutional rights that McTiernan would be giving up, the stipulated Sentencing Guideline factors, and the factual basis for the plea. He signed the agreement and a declaration, attesting that his attorney, John Carlton, had advised him of possible defenses and that he was satisfied with Carlton's legal representation. He re-executed the agreement after the government filed the information against him. Following a plea colloquy, U.S. District Judge Dale S. Fischer accepted the plea and ordered that it be entered. McTiernan requested and obtained multiple continuances of his sentencing date until the government informed him that it would not agree to further continuances because it was dissatisfied with his failure to provide truthful cooperation in connection with his offense. Eleven days before McTiernan was scheduled to be sentenced, San Diego attorney S. Todd Neal advised the government that he would be substituted for Carlton as McTiernan's new counsel. When the government informed Neal that it would not move for a downward departure based on cooperation and would seek a custodial sentence for McTiernan, Neal informed the government that the defense was going to file a motion to withdraw McTiernan's guilty plea and suppress the recording. The motion alleged that McTiernan was entitled to withdraw his plea because his former counsel had failed to obtain any discovery materials from the government prior to the time McTiernan entered his pre-indictment plea and failed to advise him that he could have sought to suppress the recording on the ground that it was made by Pellicano without McTiernan's knowledge and consent and for an allegedly "criminal or tortious purpose," in violation of Title III and 18 U.S.C. § 2515. Fischer found that McTiernan's alleged reasons for seeking withdrawal lacked credibility. "[T]he most reasonable conclusion is that McTiernan seeks to withdraw his plea because the government has asked for a custodial sentence," Fischer wrote. "This is unquestionably not valid grounds to grant permission to withdraw a plea." She denied the motion and immediately proceeded to sentencing, imposing a term of four months imprisonment, followed by a two-year period of supervised release. Although McTiernan's desire to avoid a custodial sentence may have been his motivation for moving to withdraw his plea, Senior Circuit Judge Roger J. Miner of the Second Circuit U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting by designation, wrote for the appellate court that such motivation was not disqualifying if there was otherwise a "fair and just reason" to withdraw the plea. McTiernan was not required to produce evidence that his suppression motion would be successful on the merits, Miner explained, but only that proper advice about the possibility of suppression could plausibly have motivated a reasonable person in his position not to have pled guilty. Noting that Carlton's declaration in support of McTiernan's motion only stated that Carlson "did not see" any grounds "under the wiretap statute" for suppression, and Miner reasoned it did not establish that McTiernan was properly and adequately advised. "As long as a criminal or tortious purpose is a realistic possibility under the circumstances - which it assuredly is here - there is nothing inherently implausible about the proposition that a reasonable person would not have pled guilty and would instead have sought through discovery to establish an illicit motive for the taping," Miner concluded. The panel remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether McTiernan could establish a fair and just reason to withdraw his plea.
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A finding that a group to which a defendant belongs is a criminal street gang cannot be based solely on the relationship between that group and a larger criminal organization, the Fifth District Court of Appeal ruled yesterday. The justices overturned the special-circumstance finding that a convicted murderer from Madera County, Michael Alan Williams, killed his victim as part of gang activity, as well as his separate conviction of actively participating in a gang. The court said there was enough evidence to prove that Williams' group, the Small Town Peckerwoods, was a criminal street gang, but that jurors may have "erroneously considered evidence related to some larger Peckerwood organization." In an unpublished portion of the opinion, however, the panel upheld Williams's conviction of the first degree murder of Rose Johnston in 2004. Johnston's burned out car was found in an orchard in rural Madera County two days after she was last seen alive, at a party attended by members of the Small Town Peckerwoods. Charred remains found in the car were later identified as hers. Investigators soon established that she spent time with members of the group and began questioning some of them, including Williams, who by that time was in jail for an unrelated offense. Williams said Johnston was a "homie hopper," meaning a woman who dated multiple gang members, but that he had no problems with her. He claimed to have seen her leave the party before he did. Investigators, however, ultimately concluded that Williams and fellow gang member Raymond Elisarraras killed Johnston by stabbing her and then drove the body out to the orchard in Johnston's car before setting it ablaze. They said Williams was upset because Johnston had sparked a rivalry between two of the members, leading to a fistfight at the party during which a knife was pulled. The two were charged with the murder, but Elisarraras committed suicide before trial. Among the witnesses at Williams' trial was a Madera police officer who qualified as an expert on gangs. He explained that the Small Town Peckerwoods, with about 16 members who wore "STP" tattoos, were a cell of a loosely organized gang with about 100 members on the West Coast. Members, he said, took their orders from "shot callers" who answered to higher authorities within the prison system, as indicated by a poem found in what was believed to be Elisarraras' bedroom: "We're Peckerwood Soldiers down/for a cause, California convicts/and solid outlaws. The rules/we live by are written in/stone, awesome an fearless we're/bad to the bone. We live in California Prisons/all long the way, the man tries/to down us with each passing day./Our bodies are solid an blazen/with in, warbirds on SS lightning/bolts the way that we think. When we go into battle our/hands are held high, some/may get hurt yet others may/die. It's a small price we/pay to survive in the yard, we're/Peckerwood Soldiers down for a/cause, California convicts and/solid outlaws." Besides the Small Town Peckerwoods, the Madera cells included the Crazy White Boys, Krazy White Boys, and Dirty White Boys, the officer testified. The crimes committed by the gang, he said, included arson, assault, and homicide. Williams was convicted of first murder with a gang special circumstance, and of participation in a criminal street gang, and Madera Superior Court Judge Jennifer Detjen sentenced him to life imprisonment without parole, plus one year. Presiding Justice James Ardaiz, writing for the Court of Appeal, agreed that testimony about the gang's activities and the crimes its members had committed supported a finding that it was a criminal street gang. Ardaiz also concluded, however, that the trial judge erred in allowing jurors to consider the larger gang's activities in determining whether the Small Town Peckerwoods met the statutory definition of a criminal street gang as an organization whose members have engaged in a pattern of felonies involving theft, guns, violence, or drug dealing. He distinguished People v. Ortega (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1344, in which the court held that the defendant could be found to have committed a crime on behalf of the Norteno gang in the absence of proof as to what specific subset of the gang the defendant belonged to. The evidence in that case, Ardaiz said, established that all of the subsets of the Nortenos shared the same goals and activities. "Here, by contrast, Dilbeck testified that Peckerwoods are a criminal street gang, as defined by the Penal Code, and that smaller groups, such as the Small Town Peckerwoods, are all factions of the Peckerwood organization," the presiding justice wrote. "Insofar as is shown by the record before us, his conclusion appears to have been based on commonality of name and ideology, rather than concerted activity or organizational structure." Ardaiz went on to explain: "In our view, something more than a shared ideology or philosophy, or a name that contains the same word, must be shown before multiple units can be treated as a whole when determining whether a group constitutes a criminal street gang. Instead, some sort of collaborative activities or collective organizational structure must be inferable from the evidence, so that the various groups reasonably can be viewed as parts of the same overall organization. There was no such showing here. Dilbeck's general references to 'shot callers' answering to a higher authority within the prison system were insufficient, absent any testimony that the group calling themselves the Small Town Peckerwoods contained such a person, or that such a person was a liaison between, or authority figure within, both groups."
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A trial court violated the constitutional rights of a man it later sentenced to 40 years to life in prison for throwing billiard balls during a bar fight when it prevented him from impeaching the prosecution's key trial witness for lying under oath, the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled yesterday. Concluding that a reasonable jury might have received a "significantly different impression" of a witness whose testimony was crucial to establishing the defendant's intent had it known the witness's claim that he was not on probation was false, Judge Jay S. Bybee wrote that Michael Slovik was entitled to habeas corpus relief because the violation of Slovik's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him was not harmless error. Slovik was drinking at a bar named Gusser's Carousel in El Cajon, outside of San Diego, at approximately 1 a.m. in 1998 when a fight occurred during which he allegedly threw three billiard balls at a bartender and other patrons after being told to leave. He was tried on two counts of assault with a deadly weapon - the balls - and by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, and two counts of battery. However, as noted by Bybee, "[t]he various witnesses and participants - as the State points out, indisputably not picked from a Sunday school choir - offered conflicting testimony." Among others, the prosecution relied at trial on the testimony of a patron, Mark Featherstone, who said that Slovik had been ejected after doing backflips throughout the bar, and that Slovik had thrown the balls at Featherstone's face while chasing him around a pool table. When Featherstone answered "no" when asked if currently on probation, Slovik's counsel - in possession of a form establishing that Featherstone had been placed on five years' probation for driving under the influence of alcohol - sought to impeach him, but the prosecution objected, and the trial court agreed that questioning Featherstone about his probationary status would be too time consuming. Ultimately convicted of one count of assault with a deadly weapon, one count of battery, and a reduced charge of simple assault, Slovik was sentenced to 40 years to life as a result of the California three-strikes law and other sentencing enhancements. The California Court of Appeal later reduced his sentence to 35 years to life, but upheld his convictions and rejected a state habeas petition. However, on Slovik's appeal from a similar ruling by U.S. District Judge Roger T. Benitez of the Southern District of California denying Slovik's federal habeas petition, Bybee wrote that the California Court of Appeal's decision upholding the trial court's limitation on use of the impeachment evidence was an unreasonable application of clearly established law. "The evidence that Featherstone was placed on five years' probation for driving under the influence was not being proffered to establish that Featherstone was unreliable because he was on probation, but rather to establish that Featherstone was unreliable because he had lied about being on probation," Bybee said. "It is clear to us that the jurors might have formed a significantly different impression of Featherstone's credibility if they had heard cross-examination showing that Featherstone was willing to lie under oath." Bybee similarly reasoned that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the jury - had it concluded that Featherstone was willing to lie under oath - could have discounted his testimony, and because Featherstone's testimony was crucial to establishing that Slovik intended to hit people with the billiard balls, rather than throw them aimlessly.
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A DUI carries with it a list of possible court-imposed consequences. A first time offender can face probation, up to six months jail time, a fine of up to $1000 plus penalties, a lifetime conviction on his/her permanent record, alcohol rehabilitation, an ignition interlock may be required (must blow into a breathalyzer to demonstrate sobriety before the car will start) and/or community service. Those are some but not all of the possible criminal court consequences. On top of that one faces the DMV hearing consequences of license suspension, being required to file an SR-22 form for three years in order to maintain one's driving privileges once they have been reinstated, commercial driver's licenses may be suspended or permanently revoked, and if caught driving on an already suspended license then the car will be impounded and mandatory jail time is at stake in the criminal case if convicted. A DUI can be very costly in terms of the immediate penalties imposed. But what about the secondary consequences of a DUI? That is, what about the consequences which take effect after the court has made its ruling and the DMV hearing has concluded? There are many lasting consequences resulting from a DUI conviction that individuals often do not even think about. These may include but are not limited to: financial consequences, insurance consequences, immigration consequences, employment consequences, unrelated legal consequences, and consequences that are merely an inconvenience.
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In is a common misconception that the person reporting the domestic violence charges has the right to decide whether or not to press charges. Once the police get involved it is no longer in the complaining party's control. Instead, it is now up to the prosecutor to decide whether or not the case goes to court. Thus, the testimony of your partner or the individual claiming domestic violence can be very important to your case. Where the complaining party does not wish to prosecute, it is important that you retain an experienced and knowledgeable attorney to help you because he/she may be able to speak to the prosecutor to prevent the filing of the case in the first place. However, if the case does get filed and goes to trial, it is important that you encourage your partner or the individual claiming domestic violence to testify in court and give a truthful account of what happened. Otherwise, statements that were made to the police or the 911 operator at the time of the incident are admissible in court. This is an exception to the normal "hearsay" rules governing testimony that is admissible in trial. "Hearsay" refers to any statements that are made outside of the court but are brought into the court as evidence of the alleged claim. California Evidence Code Section 1240 allows for statements made outside of court by the complaining party to be admitted in court as evidence so long as he/she was describing the events that he/she was viewing or experiencing at the time the statement was made. This would include 911 calls made at the time of the incident. California also has a "fresh complaint" hearsay exception which allows any statement to be admitted into court as evidence that is regarding a complaint made by your partner or the person claiming domestic violence. This does not include any responses given to questioning, but it would include the initial statement of complaint made to the police. These statements can be used against you as evidence to the offense that was committed and the person responsible for such offense. However, there are ways around these exceptions which is why it is imperative that you obtain professional legal assistance.
Eisner Gorin LLP has been recognized as one of the best U.S. law firms, based on the experience, professionalism, and ethics of its criminal defense lawyers and attorneys. We aggressively defend clients in all Southern California courtrooms on state and federal charges, including DUI, DMV, misdemeanor, felony, juvenile cases, in the following communities and courthouses.